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GENERALIZED POTENTIAL GAMES
M. H. DUONG, T. H. DANG-HA, Q. B. TANG, AND H. M. TRAN
Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a notion of generalized potential games that is
inspired by a newly developed theory on generalized gradient flows. More precisely, a game
is called generalized potential if the simultaneous gradient of the loss functions is a nonlinear
function of the gradient of a potential function. Applications include a class of games arising
from chemical reaction networks with detailed balance condition. For this class of games, we
prove an explicit exponential convergence to equilibrium for evolution of a single reversible
reaction. Moreover, numerical investigations are performed to calculate the equilibrium
state of some reversible chemical reactions which give rise to generalized potential games.
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1. Introduction
In the seminal work [MS96] Monderer and Shapley introduced a fundamental concept of
(multi-player) potential games1. They are a class of games where the incentive of all players to
change their strategy can be expressed via a single common function, the potential function.
From the mathematical point of view, a game is potential if the simultaneous gradient of
the loss functions are equal to the gradient of the potential function (with respect to the
corresponding controllable variable) scaled by weight factors. Using the potential function,
the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and the convergence to these equilibria have
been shown [MS96, Ros73]. Furthermore, the computation of a Nash equilibrium is reduced
to the solution of an optimization problem: finding a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is
equivalent to finding a local minimum of the potential function. In practice, Nash equilibria
are often computed using the standard gradient descent method. Because of these distinctive
Dang contributed to this work when he was at the University of Oslo.
1In this paper, potential games covers both exact and weighted potential games as defined in [MS96], cf.
Section 2.
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features, potential games have been studied intensively in theoretical research as well as have
been found in a cornucopia of practical applications in economics [MS96, Ros73, AV01, OS05,
MW08] and other disciplines such as artificial intelligence and computer vision [MZ91, YB95],
theoretical computer science, computational social science and sociology [MS09, MS10] and
wireless networks [Yam15]. More recently, methods and concepts from game theory have been
increasingly used in machine learning. For example, the celebrated Generative Adversarial
Networks can be formulated as a two-player zero-sum game between two neural networks
(the discriminator and the generator) [GPAM+14] and learning with bandit feedback can be
cast in the framework of potential games [HCM17]. We refer the reader to recent articles
[SZ16, LBR+19, ZKX19] and references therein for further information .
The ultimate goal of this paper is to introduce a generalization of potential games inspired
by recent developments in the theory of generalized gradient flows in the field of partial differ-
ential equations. In a classical gradient system, the evolution decreases a driving (entropy)
functional “as fast as possible” given by a (quadratic) dissipation potential expressing a
linear relation between rates and driving forces [Ons31a, Ons31b, Mor86, O¨tt05]. Solutions
to a gradient flow system can also be iteratively approximated using the steepest gradient
descent method [AGS08]. Recently, a concept of generalized gradient flows has been intro-
duced where the dissipation potential is not necessarily quadratic [Mie11, MPR14]. This
generalization significantly enlarges the class of classical gradient systems and finds new ap-
plications in different areas, such as in the modeling of materials (for example, for plasticity
and ferromagnetism) and in chemical reaction networks. Furthermore, generalized gradient
flows arise in two natural ways: via large-deviation principles from the hydrodynamic limit
of microscopic many-particle systems [Duo14, MPR14] or as suitable multiscale limits (evo-
lutionary Γ-convergence) of classical gradient systems [Mie16, LMPR17]. The existence of
the potential function as well as the linear relation between the simultaneous gradient of
the loss functions and the gradient of the potential function in potential games resemble the
existence of the driving functional and the linear relation between rates and driving forces.
Motivated by this newly developed theory and the similarities between potential games and
classical gradient flows, we introduce a notion of generalized potential games where the si-
multaneous gradient of loss functions is a nonlinear function of the gradient of a potential
function. This notion enlarges significantly the class of games which can be studied using
tools from (generalized) gradient flows. Moreover, by providing an alternative criterion of
potential games via the symmetrizability of the Hessian matrix, we give a necessary and
sufficient condition for a game to be generalized potential.
To show the applicability of our concept, we consider a class of loss functions arising
from chemical reaction network theory under detailed balance condition. This theory has
been employed in many places, from classical areas such as chemistry [Fei19] to evolutionary
game theory [VRBDF14, VSC+18], social sciences [DdF07, PL08] and recently in machine
learning [KB11, SR18, FMG+18]. Here we bring it to classical game theory.
We show in this paper that if a chemical reaction system satisfies the detailed balance
condition, then the game arising from this system is generalized potential. This enables us
to use the projected gradient steepest descent method to calculate the chemical equilibrium.
This is closely related to the trend to equilibrium of the evolution for the chemical reactions.
We thus prove an explicit convergence to equilibrium for the case of a single reversible reac-
tion with an arbitrary number of chemical species by the Bakry-Emery strategy. Numerical
simulations show the similarity of the evolution and the convergence to stationary point of
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the potential function in the projected steepest gradient descent method. Therefore, we
expect that a discrete version of our proof based on Bakry-Emery strategy will shed light on
the convergence of numerical methods for generalized potential games.
To sum up, the main contributions of our paper are the following:
(1) we introduce a notion of generalized potential games enlarging significantly the class
of classical potential games;
(2) we provide a connection between potential games and symmetrizable matrices, and
use this connection to characterize generalized potential games;
(3) we calculate numerically the equilibrium sate of several reversible reaction systems,
and compare them with the evolution of the system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we recall the
definition of potential games and provide a connection to symmetrizable matrices. The
notion of generalized potential games is introduced in Section 3.1 where we also provide
a necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be generalized potential. Using this
condition, we show in Section 3.2 that a game arising from a chemical reaction system
is generalized potential if the system satisfies the detailed balance condition. An explicit
exponential convergence to equilibrium for the evolution of a single reversible reaction is also
given. In Section 4, several games from specific chemical reactions are studied numerically.
Finally, Section 5 is devoted to conclusion and outlook.
2. Potential games and symmetrizable matrices
In this section, we recall the concept of potential games and relevant results, which have
attracted a lot of attention recently in the machine learning community [BRM+18, LBR+19].
Moreover, we establish a connection between potential games and symmetrizable matrices.
Definition 2.1. A n-player differentiable game is a set of players [n] = {1, . . . , n} and twice
continuously differentiable loss functions2
`i : D1 × . . .×Dn −→ R
w = (w1, . . . ,wn) 7→ `i(w),
where wi ∈ Di ⊂ Rdi with
∑n
i=1 di = d. The objective of each player is to minimize its loss
function, that is to seek
w∗i = argminwi∈Di`i(w).
The simultaneous gradient is the combination of gradients of the losses with respect to the
controllable parameters of the corresponding players:
ξ(w) = (∇w1`1, . . . ,∇wn`n). (1)
A point w∗ ∈ Rd is called a fixed point (Nash stationary point) of the game if
ξ(w∗) = (∇w1`1(w∗), . . . ,∇wn`n(w∗)) = 0.
An important class of differentiable games are potential games introduced in the seminal
paper [MS96].
2also called payoff/utility functions in the literature. We use the terminology loss function since we
consider the minimization problem.
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Definition 2.2. A game is called a potential game if and only if there exist a function
φ : Rd → R and positive numbers {αi}ni=1 such that
αi∇wi`i = ∇wiφ ∀i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
Note that in [MS96] games satisfying condition (2) are called weighted potential games
and in particular exact potential games when αi = 1 for all i. An advantage of potential
games is that we only need to work with one single potential function φ instead of n different
loss functions {`i}ni=1. The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition
to determine a potential game and a useful formula to compute the potential function.
Theorem 2.3. [MS96, Theorem 4.5] A differentiable game is potential if and only if there
exist positive numbers (weights) {αi}ni=1 such that
αi∇2wiwj`i = αj∇2wiwj`j ∀ i, j. (3)
Under this condition, there exists a potential φ that satisfies
φ(z1)− φ(z0) =
n∑
i=1
αi
∫ 1
0
z′i(t) · ∇wi`i(z(t))) dt ∀ z0, z1 ∈ Z, (4)
where z : [0, 1] → Z is a continuously differentiable path in Z that connects two strategy
profiles z0 and z1, that is z(0) = z0 and z(1) = z1.
Furthermore, the potential function is uniquely defined up to an additive constant.
Using the potential function, the existence and attainability of a pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium have been proved [MS96, Ros73]. Furthermore, it can be numerically computed
using the steepest gradient descent method under a broad range of conditions [LSJR16].
There is a vast literature about potential games, and we refer the reader to monographs
[NRTV07, LCS16] for great expositions on this topic. Identifying a potential game by show-
ing the existence of the weights in (3) is a non-trivial task. It would be more useful to seek
a condition that can be verified intrinsically using only the given loss functions. In the next
section, we discuss this issue.
Next, we establish a connection between potential games and symmetrizable matrices. In
order to determine whether a game is potential using Definition 2.2, one needs to show the
existence of the weighted (αi)i=1,...,n which is usually difficult. One technique to overcome this
issue is to explore the connection between the Hessian of the game (see (5)) and the so-called
symmetrizable matrices, which provides an algorithm to check if a game is potential.
Definition 2.4. An n-by-n matrix A is said to be symmetrizable if there exists an invert-
ible diagonal matrix D such that DA is symmetric. In this case the matrix D is called a
symmetrizer of A.
An example of symmetrizable matrix is A =
(
2 1
1
2
−2
)
. This matrix is obviously not
symmetric but is symmetrizable because(
1 0
0 2
)
A =
(
1 0
0 2
)(
2 1
1
2
−2
)
=
(
2 1
1 −4
)
.
For more information on symmetrizable matrices we refer the reader to [BK81, VS88]. The
construction/existence of a symmetrizer D in Definition 2.4 is often nontrivial. It is more
useful to seek a necessary and sufficient condition to verify the symmetrizability of a matrix
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without invoking externally the existence of the weights. The following lemma provides such
a condition.
Lemma 2.5. [Hea53] A matrix A = (aij) is symmetrizable if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied
(1) aij = 0 implies aji = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
(2) ai1i2ai2i3 . . . aiki1 = ai2i1ai3i2 . . . ai1ik for all k ≥ 3 and i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Thanks to Lemma 2.5, an algorithm can be provided to determine whether a matrix is
symmetrizable or not. Moreover, one can also compute a corresponding symmetrizer, see
e.g. [DCD16, Algorithm 1].
We now seek the connection between potential games and symmetrizable matrices. Con-
sider an n-player differentiable game in Definition 2.1. We define the Hessian of the game
to be
H(w) :=

∇2w1w1`1 ∇2w1w2`1 . . . ∇2w1wn`1∇2w2w1`2 ∇2w2w2`2 . . . ∇2w2wn`2
...
...
. . .
...
∇2wnw1`n ∇2wnw2`n . . . ∇2wnwn`n
 . (5)
Condition (3) is then equivalent to the requirement that the matrix MH(w) is symmetric
where M = diag(α1, . . . , αn), which means that H(w) is symmetrizable. In particular, a
game is exact potential iff the Hessian matrix is symmetric.
From this observation and Lemma 2.5 we obtain the following necessary and sufficient
conditions, that are based only on the loss functions, for a game to be potential.
Theorem 2.6. A differentiable game is a potential game if and only if the Hessian matrix
H(w) is symmetrizable for all w. That is, if and only if the following conditions hold for all
w:
(1) Hij(w) = 0 implies Hji(w) = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
(2) Hi1i2(w)Hi2i3(w) . . .Hiki1(w) = Hi2i1(w)Hi3i2(w) . . .Hi1ik(w) for all k ≥ 3 and
i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We consider an important class of games recently studied in [Min18] where the loss func-
tions are given by
`i(w) = ˆ`i(wi) +
∑
1≤j 6=i≤n
wTi Cwj, (6)
where the ˆ`i are generally non-quadratic functions. Note that C is simply the Hessian matrix
of `i with respect to w = (w1, . . . ,wn). According to (3) (see also [Min18, Proposition 3.1])
we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. The game with loss functions `i given by (6) is potential if and only if there
exist positive numbers {αi}ni=1 such that
αiCij = αjC
T
ji. (7)
As a direct application of Theorem 2.6 we obtain the following necessary and sufficient
conditions for the game with loss functions (6) to be potential. Note that this condition is
directly based on the matrix C only.
Corollary 2.8. The game with loss functions `i given by (6) is weighted potential if and
only if C is symmetrizable.
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Thanks to Lemma 2.5, [DCD16, Algorithm 1] provides an algorithm to determine whether
the game with loss functions given by (6) is a potential game or not.
3. Generalized potential games
In this section, we introduce a generalization of potential games which we call generalized
potential games where the simultaneous gradient of the loss functions is a nonlinear function
of the gradient of a potential function. In the first part, we give in details the concept, as
well as its characterization. The second part provides an example of generalized potential
games arising from chemical reaction network theory.
3.1. Generalized potential games. From (1), we notice that (2) is equivalent to
ξ = M−1∇wφ where M = diag(α1, . . . , αn). (8)
Thus to define a potential game we need three elements: an underlying Hilbert space Z
(in this case, Z = Rd), a driving functional φ : Z → R, and an operator that maps the
tangential bundle TZ = Z × Z to Z (in this case it is a matrix multiplication with M−1).
Motivated by this observation and the theory of generalized gradient flow developed recently
[Mie11, MPR14], we provide a concept of generalized potential game.
Definition 3.1 ([MPR14]). A function Ψ : Z × TZ → R is called a dissipation potential if
for all z ∈ Z
(i) Ψ(z, ·) is convex in the second argument,
(ii) min Ψ(z, ·) = 0 and
(iii) Ψ(z, 0) = 0.
Given a dissipation potential Ψ, we recall that the Legendre-Fenchel dual (convex dual),
Ψ∗ : Z × T ∗Z → R, of Ψ, is defined as follows:
Ψ∗(z, ζ) = sup
s∈TzZ
{〈ζ, s〉 −Ψ(z, s)} for ζ ∈ T ∗zZ. (9)
The following lemma provides useful properties of Legendre-Fenchel duality.
Lemma 3.2. [Fen49] Let Z be a reflexive Banach space and Ψ : Z → R ∪ {∞} be proper,
convex and lower semicontinuous. Then for every ξ ∈ Z∗ and every s ∈ Z the following
statements are equivalent
(i) ξ ∈ DΨ(s) ⇐⇒ (ii) s ∈ DΨ∗(ξ) ⇐⇒ (iii) Ψ(s) + Ψ∗(ξ) = 〈ξ, s〉. (10)
Note that in this section, we will use the notation D for the Fre´chet differential to indicate
that the setup might be applicable to a more general space than Rd.
Definition 3.3. A differentiable game with loss functions {`i : Z → R}ni=1 is called a
generalized potential game if there exist a dissipation potential Ψ : TZ → R and a potential
function E : Z → R such that
ξ(w) = DζΨ∗(DwE) (11)
where ξ(w) is the simultaneous gradient defined in (1).
According to Lemma 3.2 , (11) is equivalent to
DwE(w) = DsΨ(ξ(w)). (12)
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Using the duality between Ψ and Ψ∗, we have the following equivalences for Conditions (ii)
and (iii) in Definition 3.1:
min Ψ(·) = 0 ⇐⇒ Ψ∗(0) = 0
Ψ(0) = 0 ⇐⇒ min Ψ∗ = 0.
Thus both Ψ ≥ 0 and Ψ∗ ≥ 0 attain 0 at 0. Condition (11) implies that
ξ(w) = 0 ⇐⇒ DζΨ∗(DwE) = 0 ⇐⇒ DwE = 0,
so that, as in a potential game, in a generalized potential game the negative of the simul-
taneous gradient ξ is the same as that of the potential function E . A potential game is a
special case of generalized potential games when the dissipation potential is quadratic (i.e.,
its derivative DζΨ∗(ζ) is linear)
Ψ(s) =
1
2
sTMs, Ψ∗(ζ) =
1
2
ζTM−1ζ, DζΨ∗(ζ) = M−1ζ, E = φ, (13)
where M = diag(α1, . . . , αn). Thus potential games correspond to the case where DζΨ∗(ζ) is
a linear function of ζ. A generalized potential game is then a natural extension of a potential
game since it allows nonlinear games, i.e., DζΨ∗(ζ) can be a nonlinear function of ζ. The
following theorem extends Theorem 2.3 to generalized potential games:
Theorem 3.4. A game is generalized potential iff the matrix D2Ψ(ξ(w))H(w) is symmetric.
In this case, a potential E satisfies
E(z1)− E(z0) =
∫ 1
0
z′(t) · DsΨ(ξ(z(t))) dt ∀ z0, z1 ∈ Z, (14)
where z : [0, 1] → Z is a continuously differentiable path in Z that connects two strategy
profiles z0 and z1. That is z(0) = z0 and z(1) = z1.
Proof. Condition (12) means that
DwiE = DsiΨ(ξ(w)) ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Applying Dwj to both sides, noting that ξ(w) = (∇w1`1, . . . ,∇wn`n), we get
Dwj
(DsiΨ(ξ(w))) = D2wjwiE = D2wiwjE = Dwi(DsjΨ(ξ(w))) ∀i, j,
i.e.,
n∑
k=1
D2sksiΨ(ξ(w))∇2wjwk`k =
n∑
k=1
D2sksjΨ(ξ(w))∇2wiwk`k. (15)
Using the Hessian matrix H(w) defined in (5), equality (15) can be written as
[D2Ψ(ξ(w))H(w)]ij = [D2Ψ(ξ(w))H(w)]ji ∀i, j. (16)
i.e., the matrix D2Ψ(ξ(w))H(w) is symmetric.
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Next we prove (14). Let z0, z1 ∈ Z and let z : [0, 1] → Z be a continuously differntiable
path connecting z0 and z1. We have
E(z1)− E(z0) = E(z(1))− E(z(0))
(∗)
=
∫ 1
0
d
dt
E(z(t)) dt
(∗∗)
=
∫ 1
0
z′(t) · DwE(z(t)) dt
(∗∗∗)
=
∫ 1
0
z′(t) · DsΨ(ξ(z(t))) dt
where we have applied the fundamental theorem of calculus, the chain rule and condition
(12) to obtain (∗), (∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗) respectively. 
Remark 3.5. In a potential game, using (13), we have
D2Ψ(ξ(w)) = M = diag(α1, . . . , αn).
Thus condition (16) becomes
αi∇2wiwj`i = αj∇2wiwj`j ∀i, j.
So, we recover the result of Theorem 2.3 
3.2. Examples in chemical reaction network theory.
In this section, we will show that the generalized potential games corresponding to a class
of loss functions arising from general reversible chemical reaction networks.
3.2.1. Chemical reaction networks. Consider K chemical species X1, . . . , XK subject to R
reversible reactions:
αr1X1 + . . .+ α
r
KXK
krfw−−⇀↽−
krbw
βr1X1 + . . .+ β
r
KXK (17)
for r = 1, . . . , R. The coefficients αrk, β
r
k ∈ N0 are stoichiometric coefficients and krfw, krfw > 0
are reaction rate constants. Let c = (c1, . . . , cK) ∈ RK+ denote the concentration vector of
species X1, . . . , XK . Then the reaction rate equation that characterizes the time-evolution
of the concentrations is given by
c˙ = −R(c) with R(c) :=
R∑
r=1
(
krfwc
αr − krbwcβ
r
)(
αr − βr
)
(18)
where αr = (αri )i=1,...,K and β
r = (βri )i=1,...,K , and we use the convention
cα
r
=
K∏
k=1
c
αri
i . (19)
A state w∞ ∈ Rn+ is called a chemical equilibrium for (18) if R(w∞) = 0. Moreover, w∞ is
called a detailed balanced equilibrium if
krfww
αr
∞ = k
r
bww
βr
∞ for all r = 1, . . . , R. (20)
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Note that the solution to (18) is positive, i.e. it lies in the positive orthant Rn+, as long as
the initial data is positive. Moreover, it satisfies
c(t) = c(0) +
R∑
r=1
(βr −αr)
∫ t
0
(
krfwc
αr(s)− krbwcβ
r
(s)
)
ds.
Therefore, if we define the Wegscheider matrix by W = (βr − αr)r=1,...,R ∈ Rn×R then it
follows that
c(t) ∈ c(0) + range(W ) for all t ≥ 0.
The affine space (c(0)+range(W ))∩Rn+ is therefore called the positive compatibility class (or
shortly compatibility class) corresponding to c(0). The following lemma gives the existence
and uniqueness of a positive detailed balanced equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6. [Fei19] If the chemical reaction network (17) has a detailed balanced equi-
librium, then all other equilibria are also detailed balanced. In this case we say that the
network (17) is detailed balanced.
If the chemical reaction network (17) is detailed balanced, then there exists a unique positive
equilibrium in each compatibility class.
Remark 3.7. It is remarked that there might exist (possibly infinitely) many boundary equi-
libria, i.e. a state c∗ ∈ ∂Rn+ which satisfies (20) within each compatibility class. 
3.2.2. Generalized potential games from chemical reaction networks. Consider an n-player
game where the loss functions are given by
`1(w) =
R∑
r=1
( krfw
αr1 + 1
w
αr1+1
1 w
αr2
2 · · ·wα
r
n
n −
krbw
βr1 + 1
w
βr1+1
1 w
αr2
2 · · ·wβ
r
n
n
)(
αr1 − βr1
)
(21a)
...
`n(w) =
R∑
r=1
( krfw
αrn + 1
w
αr1
1 w
αr2
2 · · ·wα
r
n+1
n −
krbw
βrn + 1
w
βr1
1 w
αr2
2 · · ·wβ
r
n+1
n
)(
αrn − βrn
)
. (21b)
where w = (w1, . . . , wn), α
r := (αr1, . . . , α
r
n) and β
r := (βr1 , . . . , β
r
n).
The following theorem provides an important class of generalized potential games. This
theorem is motivated from a recent theory on the generalized gradient flows of chemical
reactions [Mie11, MPR14].
Theorem 3.8. Suppose there exists w∞ ∈ Rn+ such that (20) is satisfied. Then the game
with loss functions (21a)-(21b) is a generalised potential game.
Proof. We show that the game can be viewed as a generalized potential game by showing the
existence of a potential function E and a dissipation function Ψ∗. These functions have been
derived in the context of generalized gradient flow structure of chemical reactions [Mie11].
10 M. H. DUONG, T. H. DANG-HA, Q. B. TANG, AND H. M. TRAN
Let us define the dissipation Ψ∗ and the potential function E by
E(w) :=
n∑
i=1
wi
(
log
( wi
wi∞
)− 1), (22)
Ψ∗(w,µ) =
R∑
r=1
κr
2
`
(wαr
wαr∞
,
wβ
r
wβ
r
∞
)(
µ · (αr − βr)
)2
, (23)
where
`(a, b) =
{
a−b
log a−log b for a 6= b,
b for a = b.
(24)
Note that Ψ∗ can be written as the quadratic form
Ψ∗(w,µ) =
1
2
µTH(w)µ where H(w) =
R∑
r=1
κr`
(wαr
wαr∞
,
wβ
r
wβ
r
∞
)
(αr − βr)(αr − βr)T . (25)
Hence ∇wΨ∗(w,µ) = H(w)µ. Therefore,
∇wΨ∗(w,∇wE(w)) = H(w)∇wE(w).
We compute
∇wE(w) =

log
(
w1
w1∞
)
...
log
(
wn
wn∞
)
 =: log ( ww∞
)
DµΨ∗(w,µ) =
R∑
r=1
κr`
(wαr
wαr∞
,
wβ
r
wβ
r
∞
)(
µ · (αr − βr)
)(
αr − βr
)
.
Since
log
( wn
wn∞
)
·
(
αr − βr
)
= log
( w
w∞
)αr−βr
, `
(wαr
wαr∞
,
wβ
r
wβ
r
∞
)
=
wα
r
/wα
r
∞ −wβr/wβr∞
log
(
w
w∞
)αr−βr
we obtain
DµΨ∗(w,∇wE(w)) =
R∑
r=1
κr
(wαr
wαr∞
− w
βr
wβ
r
∞
)(
αr − βr
)
=
R∑
r=1
(
krfww
αr − krbwwβ
r
)(
αr − βr
)
, (26)
where we have used the detailed balance condition (20) to obtain the last equality. On the
other hand, we have for j = 1, . . . , n,
∇wj`j(w) =
R∑
r=1
(
krfww
αr − krbwwβ
r
)(
αrj − βrj
)
.
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Using the simultaneous gradient in (1) we can write these in a compact form as
ξ(w) =
R∑
r=1
(
krfww
αr − krbwwβ
r
)(
αr − βr
)
(27)
From (26) and (27) we get
ξ(w) = DµΨ∗(w,∇wE(w)) = H(w)∇wE(w). (28)
Hence the game is a generalized potential game. 
Remark 3.9. At this point, we remark that the condition in Lemma 2.5 is also a charac-
terization of the detailed balance condition. Indeed, consider a first order reaction network
of n chemical species S1, . . . , Sn which react through the following first order reactions
Si
aij
aji
Sj,
where aij, aji ≥ 0 are reaction rate constants. Then the condition given in Lemma 2.5
is equivalent to the fact that this first order reaction network satisfies the detailed balance
condition [Hea53]. 
Remark 3.10. We notice that (28) is a generalization of (8) where the constant (and
diagonal) matrix M−1 is replaced by H(w) which is dependent on w. It should be mentioned
that the pair (E ,Ψ) is not uniquely determined. Another choice, which arises from large-
deviation theory of interacting systems, is given by [MPR14, MPR16]:
E¯(w) := 1
2
n∑
i=1
wi
(
log
( wi
wi∞
)− 1),
Ψ¯∗(w,µ) =
R∑
r=1
Ψ∗r(w,µ), Ψ
∗
r(w,µ) = 2κrw
1
2
αr+ 1
2
βr
(
cosh
(
αr − βr) · µ− 1).
Note that E¯ = 1
2
E, and Ψ¯∗ is a non-quadratic potential function. 
The equilibrium of the loss functions defined in (21a)–(21b) agrees with the detailed bal-
ance equilibrium of the chemical reaction network presented in (17). Therefore, finding the
equilibrium for the game defined in (21a)–(21b) relates strongly to the trend to equilibrium
of the evolution system (18). The latter issue is well studied thanks to the recent advances
concerning the large time behavior of chemical reaction networks. The following exponential
convergence to equilibrium for detailed balanced systems was proved in [DFT17]3.
Proposition 3.11. Assume that the chemical reaction network (17) is detailed balanced and
possesses no boundary equilibria. Then, for each positive initial data, the corresponding solu-
tion converges exponentially to the detailed balanced equilibrium within the same compatibility
class.
Remark 3.12.
(i) The convergence to equilibrium for a system with boundary equilibria is related to
the Global Attractor Conjecture [CDSS09], which is still a famous open problem in
chemical reaction network theory.
3The results in [DFT17] in fact covers a more general class called complex balanced systems.
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(ii) The exponential convergence to equilibrium in Proposition 3.11 was obtained via a
contradiction argument, and therefore the convergence rate is not explicit. Up to our
knowledge, the explicit convergence rate for (17) is in general unknown. Nevertheless,
for a single reversible reaction with an arbitrary number of chemical species, the con-
vergence rate can be calculated explicitly. We demonstrate that result in Proposition
3.13 below.
(ii) If we consider the spatial diffusion for each species in (17), then we obtain a reaction-
diffusion system instead of a differential system. The proof of equilibration in this
case is much more involved. We refer the interested reader to [FT18].

Proposition 3.13. Let α1, . . . , αm, β1, . . . , βn ∈ [1,∞) and consider the reversible reaction
α1A1 + α2A2 + . . .+ αmAm
kb
kf
β1B1 + β2B2 + . . .+ βnBn. (29)
Denote by ai(t) and bj(t), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} the concentrations of Ai and
Bj at time t > 0 respectively. Then for any positive initial data (a0, b0) ∈ (0,∞)m+n, the
concentrations converge exponentially to equilibrium with computable rates, i.e.
m∑
i=1
|ai(t)− ai∞|2 +
n∑
j=1
|bj(t)− bj∞|2 ≤ C0e−λt
where the constants C0 and λ can be explicitly computed.
Proof. The proof utilises the Bakry-Emery strategy, and we postpone it to Appendix A in
order to not interrupt the train of thought.
We emphasize that although the convergence to equilibrium can be obtained by a contra-
diction argument (see e.g. [DFT17, Proposition 2.3]), the proof based on the Bakry-Emery
method in Appendix A has the advantage of providing an explicit rate of the convergence.
Moreover, we believe that the convergence of a discrete version of this method leads to the
convergence of algorithms finding equilibrium of the games defined in (21a)–(21b). We leave
this interesting point for future investigation. 
4. Numerical investigations
In this section we apply the projected steepest gradient descent method to numerically
calculate the Nash equilibrium of generalized potential games arising from some specific
chemical reactions. Moreover, we compare the behavior of the numerical schemes with the
evolution of the chemical systems to see their close relation.
Consider a general reversible chemical reaction
αr1X1 + . . .+ α
r
KXK
krfw−−⇀↽−
krbw
βr1X1 + . . .+ β
r
KXK (30)
for r = 1, . . . , R. Suppose that the detailed balance condition (20) is satisfied. According
to Proposition 3.6, given an initial state, the reversible chemical reaction (30) possesses a
unique positive equilibrium state in the same compatibility class. To take into account the
conservation of mass, we will apply the projected gradient descent method, see for instance
[CM87, SW18]. Below we consider three concrete examples.
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Example 1 (A single reversible reaction) Consider the following chemical reaction:
2NaCl + CaCO3 
 Na2CO3 + CaCl2 (31)
Let w1 = [NaCl], w2 = [CaCO3], w3 = [Na2CO3], w4 = [CaCl2]. According to the law of
mass action we obtain the following system of differential equations:
w˙1 = −2(k+w21w2 − k−w3w4), w˙2 = −(k+w21w2 − k−w3w4)
w˙3 = (k+w
2
1w2 − k−w3w4), w˙4 = (k+w21w2 − k−w3w4).
The loss functions are given by
`1 = 2(
1
3
k+w
3
1w2 − k−w1w3w4), `2 = (
1
2
k+w
2
1w
2
2 − k−w2w3w4)
`3 = −(k+w21w2w3 −
1
2
k−w23w4), `4 = −(k+w21w2w4 −
1
2
k−w3w24).
The potential function is given by:
E =
4∑
i=1
wi
(
log(wi/wi∞)− 1
)
.
Conservation of mass:
w1 + 2w3 = C1, w1 + 2w4 = C2
w2 + w4 = C3, w2 + w3 = C4
Using the projected gradient method, the concentrations of all chemical species in the corre-
sponding chemical reaction converge to a close neighborhood of the equilibrium point (Fig.1
(a,b)). In this case, the gradient vector is approximately 0, hence the KKT point is attained
(within certain numerical error), and all quantities remain constant near equilibrium.
Example 2 (A network of reversible reactions) The example below is from combustion
chemistry and models the burning of fuel in a combustion chamber such as in a car engine.
O2
k1−⇀↽−
k2
2O, H2
k3−⇀↽−
k4
2H, N2
k5−⇀↽−
k6
2N, CO2
k7−⇀↽−
k8
O+CO, OH
k9−−⇀↽−
k10
O+H, H2O
k11−−⇀↽−
k12
O+2H.
Let
w1 = [O], w2 = [H], w3 = [CO], w4 = [OH], w5 = [O2],
w6 = [H2], w7 = [H2O], w8 = [CO2], w9 = [N ], w10 = [N2].
It is remarked that this system can be split into one system of (w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8)
and one of (w9, w10), which are decoupled. For brevity, we will consider only the former
system, since the latter is simpler (and can be treated similarly to Example 1). According
to the law of mass action we obtain the following system of differential equations
w˙1 = 2(k1w5 − k2w21) + (k7w8 − k8w1w3) + (k9w4 − k10w1w2) + (k11w7 − k12w1w22)
w˙2 = 2(k3w6 − k4w22) + (k9w4 − k10w1w2) + 2(k11w7 − k12w1w22)
w˙3 = (k7w8 − k8w1w3), w˙4 = −(k9w4 − k7w1w2)
w˙5 = −(k1w5 − k2w21), w˙6 = −(k3w6 − k4w22)
w˙7 = −(k11w7 − k12w1w22), w˙8 = −(k7w8 − k8w1w3).
(32)
14 M. H. DUONG, T. H. DANG-HA, Q. B. TANG, AND H. M. TRAN
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
iteration
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
NaCl
CaCO3
Na2CO3
CaCl2
1 2 3 4 5 6
time
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
NaCl
CaCO3
Na2CO3
CaCl2
(a) CaCO3 example
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
iteration
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
O
H
CO
O2
H2
CO2
OH
H2O
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
time
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
O
H
CO
O2
H2
CO2
OH
H2O
(b) Combustion engine example
Figure 1. Comparing convergence of projected gradient method and numer-
ical solution for different chemical reactions satisfying mass conservation law
System (32) has three linearly independent conservation laws, for all t ≥ 0,
w1(t) + w4(t) + 2w5(t) + w7(t) + w8(t) = M1
w2(t) + w4(t) + w6(t) + 2w7(t) = M2,
w3(t) + w8(t) = M3.
(33)
By direct computations, for positive initial masses M1,M2,M3 > 0, there exists a unique
positive equilibrium to (32) satisfying the conservation laws (33) and solving
k2w
2
1∞ = k1w5∞, k10w1∞w2∞ = k9w4∞,
k4w
2
2∞ = k3w6∞, k12w1∞w
2
2∞ = k11w7∞,
k8w1∞w3∞ = k7w8∞.
(34)
Therefore, system (32) is detailed balanced. Moreover, there exists no boundary equilibrium
(direct verification), and it follows immediately from Proposition 3.11 that any solution to
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(32) converges exponentially to the detailed balance equilibrium in the same stoichiometric
compatibility class. The loss functions in this case are computed as
`1 = −2(k1w5w1 − 1
3
k2w
3
1)− (k7w1w8 −
1
2
k8w
2
1w3)
− (k9w1w4 − 1
2
k10w
2
1w2)− (k11w1w7 −
1
2
k12w
2
1w
2
2)
`2 = −2(k3w6w2 − 1
3
k4w
3
2)− (k9w2w4 −
1
2
k10w1w
2
2)− 2(k11w7w2 −
1
3
k12w1w
3
2)
`3 = −(k7w3w8 − 1
2
k8w1w
2
3), `4 = (
1
2
k1w
2
5 − k2w21w5)
`5 = (
1
2
k3w
2
6 − k4w22w6), `6 = (
1
2
k7w
2
8 − k8w1w3w8)
`7 = (
1
2
k9w
2
4 − k10w1w2w4), `8 = (
1
2
k11w
2
7 − k12w1w22w7).
Under the detailed balance condition, the potential is given by
E =
8∑
i=1
wi
(
log(wi/w∞)− 1
)
.
Ψ∗(w1, . . . , w8;µ1, . . . , µ8)
=
κ1
2
`
( w5
w5∞
,
w21
w21∞
)
(µ5 − 2µ1)2 + 1
2
κ2`
( w6
w6∞
,
w22
w22∞
)
(µ6 − 2µ2)2
+
1
2
κ4`
( w8
w8∞
,
w1w3
w1∞w3∞
)
(µ8 − µ1 − µ3)2 + 1
2
κ5`
( w4
w4∞
,
w1w2
w1∞w2∞
)
(µ4 − µ1 − µ2)2
+
1
2
κ6`
( w7
w7∞
,
w1w
2
2
w1∞w22∞
)
(µ7 − µ1 − 2µ2)2.
Similar to the above example, using projected gradient method, the concentrations of all
chemical species in the corresponding chemical reaction converge to a close neighborhood
of equilibrium point ( Fig.1(c,d)). In most cases, we observe the oscillations around the
equilibrium point. This is due to the finite numerical error when approaching the optimal
points of loss functions. Using a smaller time step will reduce oscillations.
This example and the above example show the validity of the projected gradient method
in finding equilibria of the chemical reactions.
Example 3 (A reaction network without conservation laws)
S1 + S2 3S1
2S1 + S32S2
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Figure 2. Convergence of (a) gradient descend method and (b) numerical
solution for chemical reaction that does not satisfy mass conservation law
For simplicity, we assume that all reaction rate constants are one. Denote by w1, w2, w3 the
concentrations of S1, S2, S3 respectively. We obtain, thanks to the law of mass action
w˙1 = w1w2 − 3w31 − w21w3 + 3w22,
w˙2 = w
3
1 + 2w
2
1w3 − 3w22,
w˙3 = w
3
1 − 2w21w3 + w22.
(35)
This system does not have any conservation laws, and it therefore has for any initial data
a unique positive detailed balance equilibrium (w1∞, w2∞, w3∞) = (1, 1, 1). We remark that
this system has infinitely many boundary equilibria of the form (0, 0, α) for α > 0. Thanks
to the Global Attractor Conjecture in the case of one linkage class [And11], we have
lim
t→∞
(w1(t), w2(t), w3(t)) = (w1∞, w2∞, w3∞)
provided the initial data is positive. Moreover, one can even show that this convergence is
exponential (see e.g. [DFT17, Proposition 2.3]). The loss functions in this case are computed
as
`1 =
1
2
w21w2 −
3
4
w41 −
1
3
w31w3 + 3w1w
2
2,
`2 = w2w
3
1 + 2w
2
1w2w3 − w32,
`3 = w
3
1w3 − w21w23 + w22w3.
(36)
By applying gradient descend on the loss functions in (36), the concentrations of all chemical
species in the corresponding chemical reaction converge to the equilibrium point (Fig. 2).
5. Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, we develop the concept of generalized potential games enlarging significantly
the class of potential games. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a game to
be generalized potential using the connection of this concept to symmetrizable matrices.
To show the applicability, we consider generalized potential games arising from chemical
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reaction network theory with detailed balance condition. Moreover, we use the projected
steepest gradient descent method to calculate numerically the Nash equilibrium of general-
ized potential games and compare them with the evolution of the corresponding chemical
reaction systems.
The numerical comparison in this paper hints that there’s a close connection between
the trend to equilibrium of chemical reaction systems and the convergence of numerical
methods for generalized potential games. More precisely, we believe that the convergence
of a discrete version of this method (see e.g. [JS17]) leads to the convergence of algorithms
finding equilibrium of the games defined in (21a)–(21b). This interesting fact is contained
in our forthcoming work.
Another interesting direction of research is Hamiltonian games and decomposition of gen-
eral games. Recently there has been considerable attempt in bringing concepts and methods
from mechanics to game theory and machine learning [BRM+18, LBR+19, BP19]. In par-
ticular, [BRM+18, LBR+19] have introduced a method to decompose a general multi-player
game into a potential game and a Hamiltonian game based on the Helmholtz decomposition
of the Hessian of the game. This resembles the decomposition of evolutionary dynamics into
reversible and irreversible components in the celebrated GENERIC (General Equation for
Non-Equilibrium Reversible and Irreversible Coupling) framework in non-equilibrium ther-
modynamics [O¨tt05]. A great advantage of the GENERIC framework is that it not only
automatically fulfills the laws of thermodynamics but also provides geometrical and physical
structures. In this paper we have extended potential games to generalized potential games
akin to the irreversible part of a GENERIC formulation. It would be interesting to fur-
ther employ methodology and techniques from the GENERIC framework to understand and
control the dynamics in general games. We leave this topic for future research.
Appendix A. Explicit convergence to equilibrium
In this appendix, we show the explicit convergence to equilibrium for the single reversible
reaction (29). For simplicity, we assume without loss of generality that kf = kr = 1.
Denote ai(t) and bj(t) as the concentrations of Ai and Bj respectively at time t ≥ 0, for all
i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n. The general system (18) in this case reads as
a′i = −αi(aα − bβ), for i = 1, . . . ,m,
b′j = βj(a
α − bβ), for j = 1, . . . , n,
ai(0) = ai0 > 0, for i = 1, . . . ,m,
bj(0) = bj0 > 0, for j = 1, . . . , n,
(S)
where we recall the convention (19). The solution to (S) obeys the following conservation
laws
ai(t)
αi
+
bj(t)
βj
= Mij :=
ai0
αi
+
bj0
βj
, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n. (37)
The vector M = (Mij)i=1,...,m, j=1,...,n is called the vector of initial masses. It is easy to see
that there are precisely m + n − 1 linearly independent conservations laws in (37). Thus,
once we fix a suitable set of m+n− 1 components of M , then all other laws can be derived
therefrom. For instance, M is completely defined if M1j and Mi1 are fixed for all i = 1, . . . ,m
and j = 1, . . . , n. The following Lemma follows from Proposition 3.6.
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Lemma A.1. For any fix positive initial mass vector M , there exists a unique positive
chemical equilibrium (a∞, b∞) ∈ (0,∞)m+n satisfyinga
α
∞ = b
β
∞,
ai∞
αi
+
bj∞
βj
= Mij, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n.
To study the convergence to equilibrium for (S) we consider the entropy
E[a, b] =
m∑
i=1
ϕ(ai) +
n∑
j=1
ϕ(bj) (38)
where ϕ(z) = z log z − z + 1, the relative entropy
E[a, b|a∞, b∞] = E[a, b]−E[a∞, b∞] =
m∑
i=1
ai log
ai
ai∞
−ai+ai∞+
n∑
j=1
bj log
bj
bj∞
−bj+bj∞, (39)
and its corresponding entropy dissipation
D[a, b] = − d
dt
E[a, b|a∞, b∞] = (aα − bβ) log a
α
bβ
≥ 0. (40)
Proposition A.2. Fix a positive initial mass vector M and let (a∞, b∞) be the positive
equilibrium defined by M in Lemma A.1. Then for any solution to (S) with initial mass M
we have
lim
t→∞
(a(t), b(t)) = (a∞, b∞).
Proof. ClearlyE[a, b|a∞, b∞] is a Lyapunov functional for (S) with the property thatE[a, b|a∞, b∞] =
0 if and only if (a, b) = (a∞, b∞) and
lim
(a,b)→∞
E[a, b|a∞, b∞] = 0.
On the other hand, it’s easy to check that D[a, b] ≥ 0 for all (a, b) and
D[a, b] = 0 and (a, b) satisfies the mass conservation laws (37) ⇐⇒ (a, b) = (a∞, b∞).
Therefore, by Lyapunov stability theory we have the convergence
lim
t→∞
(a(t), b(t)) = (a∞, b∞).

Lemma A.3. There exists an explicit constant C1 > 0 such that
E[a, b|a∞, b∞] ≥ C1
(
m∑
i=1
|ai − ai∞|2 +
n∑
j=1
|bj − bj∞|2
)
.
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Proof. By using the elementary inequality ϕ(z) = z log z − z + 1 ≥ (√z − 1)2 = (z−1)2
(
√
z+1)2
we
have
E[a, b|a∞, b∞] =
m∑
i=1
ai∞ϕ
(
ai
ai∞
)
+
n∑
j=1
bj∞ϕ
(
bj
bj∞
)
≥
m∑
i=1
ai∞
(ai − ai∞)2
(
√
ai +
√
ai∞)2
+
n∑
j=1
bj∞
(bj − bj∞)2
(
√
bj +
√
bj∞)2
≥ 1
M
(
m∑
i=1
|ai − ai∞|2 +
n∑
j=1
|bj − bj∞|2
)
where we used the estimate
ai ≤ αiMi1 and bj ≤ βjM1j for all i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n,
and the constant M > 0 is defined as
M = max
i=1,...,m, j=1...,n
{
1
ai∞
(
√
αiMi1 +
√
ai∞)2;
1
bj∞
(
√
βjM1j +
√
bj∞)2
}
.

Proof of Proposition 3.13. We will employ the Bakry-Emery strategy. The proof is divided
into several steps.
Step 1. Computing the derivative of the entropy dissipation (40) we have
d
dt
D[a, b] =
[
d
dt
aα − d
dt
bβ
]
log
aα
bβ
+ (aα − bβ)
[
m∑
i=1
a′i
ai
−
n∑
j=1
b′j
bj
]
= −
[
aα
m∑
i=1
α2i
ai
+ bβ
n∑
j=1
β2j
bj
]
(aα − bβ) log a
α
bβ
− (aα − bβ)2
(
m∑
i=1
αi
ai
+
n∑
j=1
βj
bj
)
≤ −
[
aα
m∑
i=1
α2i
ai
+ bβ
n∑
j=1
β2j
bj
]
D[a, b].
Step 2. We prove that there exists an explicit constant λ > 0 such that
Λ(a, b) := aα
m∑
i=1
α2i
ai
+ bβ
n∑
j=1
β2j
bj
≥ λ. (41)
We will utilize the conservation laws and distinguish two cases:
(i) if for some i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ai0 ≤ 12αi0 minj=1,...,nMi0j, then for all j = 1, . . . , n,
bj = βj
(
Mi0j −
ai0
αi0
)
≥ 1
2
βj min
k=1,...,n
Mi0k =: Kj.
By now using bj ≤ βj mini=1,...,m{Mij} we have
Λ(a, b) ≥ bβ
m∑
j=1
β2j
bj
≥
m∏
j=1
K
βj
j
m∑
j=1
βj
mini=1,...,mMij
> 0. (42)
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(ii) if ai ≥ 12αi minj=1,...,nMij =: Li for all i = 1, . . . ,m then we obtain
Λ(a, b) ≥ aα
m∑
i=1
α2i
ai
≥
m∏
i=1
Lαii
m∑
i=1
α2i
Li
> 0. (43)
From (42) and (43) we get (41) with
λ = min
{
m∏
j=1
K
βj
j
m∑
j=1
βj
mini=1,...,mMij
;
m∏
i=1
Lαii
m∑
i=1
α2i
Li
}
. (44)
Step 3. It follows from the previous steps that
d
dt
D[a, b] ≤ −λD[a, b]. (45)
Gronwall’s inequality gives
D[u, v](t) ≤ e−λtD[a0, b0] and consequently lim
t→∞
D[u, v](t) = 0.
Using D[a, b] = − d
dt
E[a, b|a∞, b∞], integrating (45) on (t,+∞) and using Proposition A.2,
leads to
−D[a, b](t) ≤ −λE[a, b|a∞, b∞](t), s
or equivalently
d
dt
E[a, b|a∞, b∞] ≤ −λE[a, b|a∞, b∞].
Applying Gronwall’s lemma and Lemma A.3 yields
m∑
i=1
|ai(t)− ai∞|2 +
n∑
j=1
|bj(t)− bj∞|2 ≤ C−11 E[a0, b0|a∞, b∞]e−λt
for all t > 0. 
Appendix B. Projected steepest gradient descent algorithm
Consider the constrained optimization of the form:
min
x∈Rn
f(x)
s.t. Ax = b
The projected steepest gradient descent algorithm to solve this problem is described in
Algorithm 1 [Fre04].
Algorithm 1 Projected steepest gradient descent algorithm
0: Step 0: Initialize x
0: Step 1: Compute ∇f(x).
0: Step 2: Find moving direction
• Compute P = I − AT (AAT )−1A
• Compute β = (∇f(x)T )P∇f(x)
• If β > 0, d = −P (∇f(x))√
β
else if β = 0, d = 0.
• If ∇f(x)Td = 0 stop.
0: Step 3: Update x = x + αd. Go to step 1.
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